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INTRODUCTION 
 
The developments of the decade since Hungary’s accession to the European Union enable us 
to take stock and reflect, first in the literature, on the operation of the EU state aid regime in 
Hungary. It is hoped that our observations will be found useful by both the Hungarian and the 
international audience.  
This work does not touch upon the historical developments of the accession process 
and the interim procedures created in the Treaty of Accession. Although most aid is provided 
through state aid schemes and not through individual aid decision, this is avoided for two 
reasons. First, the high number of these schemes prevents their analysis in the confines of the 
present Chapter. Second, in contrast to the monitoring of individual aid within the national 
system, there is only very limited information available on the application of these schemes. 
As an exception, we will, however, look at the aid schemes concerning aid granted during the 
current financial and economic crisis because their application led to some interesting state 
aid cases in Hungary during this period. 
The analysis of sectoral decisions, like agriculture and transport, also falls outside the 
scope of this Chapter.
2
 The sensitive issue of state aid for the sale of agricultural land, which 
was the subject of Case C-121/10 before the EU Court, will be left out as well.
3
 
In the state aid register of the Commission, 256 Hungarian cases are included.
4
 We 
will focus only on the most important individual decisions of the Commission. It is not only 
the number of Hungarian state aid cases which is comparatively high. When measured as a 
percentage of the Hungarian GDP, the volume of the registered state aid cases from Hungary 
according to the 2011 State Aid Scoreboard amounted to nearly 2.3 per cent of the GDP 
followed by Malta with 1.4 per cent.
5
 The Scoreboard also puts Hungary as the first in the 
total provision of non-crisis aid to industry and the services economy among the 27 Member 
States.
6
 This phenomenon is not new. Already in 2004, Hungary was amongst the three 
biggest grantors of state aid among the 10 new Member States.
7
 According to information 
given by the State Aid Monitoring Office (SAMO) in the Ministry of National Development, 
this figure contained all the existing aid that had been approved under the Treaty of Accession 
and the aid given to public transport companies under contracts for the provision of services 
of general economic interest (mainly to the Hungarian State Railways' passenger transport 
company (MÁV-Start Zrt.). and to the Budapest Transport Corporation (formerly BKV Zrt., 
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now BKK Zrt.)). Without these sums, the amount of new aid granted by Hungary becomes 
considerably lower.8 
 This study first provides a brief historical background to state aid control, and sets out 
the current institutional and procedural issues in Hungary. Next, individual Commission 
decisions will follow. Decisions are not analysed in a chronological order, but alongside 
reoccurring problems in the interpretation and application of State aid law. After discussing 
the case-law on large inverstment projects, the distinction between existing aid applicable 
after accession and new aid will be dealt with. It was repeatedly a difficult issue how to apply 
the market investor test, that is why we summarise the case-law on it in an indepenedent 
subchapter. Lastly, aid given in the financial sector will close this chapter. At the end of each 
subchapter interim conclusions will guide the reader. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE AID CONTROL IN HUNGARY 
 
From 1994, under Article 62 of the Europe Agreement
9
 state aid provided by Hungary was 
incompatible with the functioning of the Agreement monitoring of which was entrusted upon 
the Association Council. In its Decision 30/1998, the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared 
that in the implementation of Article 62 Hungarian authorities and courts are not bound 
directly by the rules of the EC Treaty.
10
 In 1999, a Government Decree created the prior 
notification obligation for providers of state aid and established the State Aid Monitoring 
Office within the Ministry of Finance following the legally imposed obligation of the Minister 
of Finance to ensure that state aid is granted in accordance with Community law.
11
 In the 
period between 1999 and 2001, local authorities were not covered by the prior notification 
decree and SAMO did not have power to initiate the suspension or recovery of non-notified 
aid. From 2002 until accession, the Act on Public Finances
12
 contained a general prohibition 
on granting state aid in Hungary. A Government Decree set out the detailed substantive and 
procedural rules and provided the legal basis for the suspension and recovery of illegal aid by 
SAMO.
13
 National law now mainly contains procedural rules
14
 and in 2004 substantive state 
aid rules were abolished from national legislation giving way to the relevant EU provisions 
(Article 107 TFEU, ex Article 87 TEC) subject to the derogations granted in the Treaty of 
Accession. The institutional framework provided by SAMO remained unchanged because it 
had managed to concentrate genuine expertise in the application of state aid law and its 
system of compulsory notification had functioned efficiently.
15
 In the following, we briefly 
examine the main elements of the national legislation in force. 
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INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
 
After several reorganisations of government departments since 2004, SAMO is now part of 
the Ministry of National Development and operates as a department of the Office of the 
Secretary of State for the Review of High Priority State Contracts and State Aid. Although 
SAMO is part of the Ministry, it is granted special status by legislation. The binding opinions 
of the Office are signed by the Head of the SAMO and not by the Minister. Before delivering 
its opinion, the Office is not obliged to consult with any other department within the Ministry 
or with any other body within government. Nonetheless, consultation is a widespread practice. 
In connection with the EU state aid regime, SAMO’s role is twofold. When it instructs 
parties on EU state aid matters SAMO acts as the agent of the Commission in Hungary. On 
the European level, as the current Director-General of the Office Zsuzsanna Remetei-Filep 
puts it, its role is “to defend the official position of the Hungarian government and Hungarian 
national interest.” 
SAMO has a staff of around 15 officials. A separate unit was created within the 
Ministry of Rural Development to cover sectoral cases. Its tasks and procedures are regulated 
in a separate Government Decree.
16
 
The procedure relating to the application of EU state aid rules by SAMO was first 
regulated in 2004 in a Government Decree.
17
 After several amendments, a new Decree was 
enacted reflecting the modification of the relevant EU rules. Government Decree 37/2011 
contains procedural rules relating to the prior notification of state aid, sets out cooperation 
rules between SAMO and grantors of state aid, defines the Hungarian regional aid map, and 
prescribes the obligatory elements of state aid measures
18
. The rules on the compensation for 
services of general economic interest and the temporary rules applicable in the current 
financial and economic crisis is are also found in the Decree. 
The relevant procedural rules oblige all aid grantors to notify any draft state aid 
measure to the Minister of National Development before the proposed measure is discussed 
by the representative body of the grantor or before it is submitted for public consultation. The 
Vademecum issued by SAMO on state aid rules mentions the late notification of draft aid 
measures as a common problem.
19
 In most instances, draft aid measures are not notified to 
SAMO until after consultations within the administration, i.e. among several ministries, have 
already commenced. Often, SAMO may only be notified at an even later stage, directly before 
the final approval of the aid measure.
20
 The decree contains a national stand-still clause 
similar to the one applied in EU law. On draft measures, the Minister will form a preliminary 
opinion. The opinion will be called a statement if the draft measure is compatible with EU law 
under the de minimis rules or under the EU block exemption regulations. SAMO will submit 
to the EU Commission the summary information on the implementation of aid measures in 
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cases of where the block exemption regulations apply. Aid schemes that fall under the scope 
of the de minimis rules are registered by SAMO and it is also responsible for reminding 
grantors that the beneficiary should be informed about the character of the aid and that the 
administrative obligations concerning the provision of data on the use of aid must be 
complied with. In cases where the aid measure is exempted under the group exemption 
regulations it is a common problem that the grantor often fails to comply with its obligation to 
complete and submit the appropriate State aid notification software (SANI) forms. 
21
 
 If the draft aid measure does not fall under a block exemption regulation or de minimis 
rules, the opinion of the Minister will be called a preliminary opinion. Draft measures eligible 
for official Commission notification will be notified by the Minister. The Decree explicitly 
refers to the EU rules which hold that notifiable state aid cannot be implemented before its 
approval by the Commission. The Minister may also propose amendments to the body 
planning to grant the aid. If SAMO finds that the provisions of an aid measure do not comply 
with the EU rules, the notification cannot be submitted to the Commission unless the 
Government definitely instructs SAMO to forward the aid measure to the Commission. 
According to the available information, such an event has not taken place in the practice of 
state aid control in Hungary.
22
 Under Act CXCV of 2011 on the Treasury, state aid may only 
be paid out from the Treasury's accounts if a positive SAMO opinion has been obtained.
23
 For 
producing that, under the general procedural rules SAMO has 30 days. 
SAMO actively engages in giving guidance and assistance to aid grantors as early as 
the preparation of the rules of their aid plan and later in the course of the notification process. 
Since the opinions of SAMO are based on EU law, it places much emphasis on drawing the 
attention of grantors to the risks associated with granting state aid under the EU legal 
framework. In its preliminary opinion, SAMO may recommend the modification of the 
measure in question in order to ensure its compatibility with the EU rules. In such an event, 
SAMO may rely on its powers which are available to demand additional information from 
grantors in order to obtain a more detailed picture of the planned measure. SAMO opinions 
are not made public. 
The responsibility for notification falls on the state aid grantor. SAMO will keep the 
aid grantor informed of any additional questions raised in the process and it will forward the 
decision of the Commission concerning the notified aid plan. The Commission decision will 
also be notified by the Minister of National Development to the bodies concerned. 
In addition to basic state aid control, SAMO is also responsible for the control of so-
called structural grant sub-schemes. This is when the EU co-finances domestic state aid 
schemes from the EU Structural Funds and the conformity with state aid rules of the limb 
financed by the Member State concerned has to be checked a priori. In such circumstances, 
the calls for application of an Operational Programme under the National Development Plan 
are scrutinised beforehand by SAMO. Fulfilling this task represents a considerable proportion 
of the workload of SAMO
24
.  
In Commission procedures initiated against Hungary under EU state aid rules the 
position of the Hungarian government will be represented by SAMO officials. In high priority 
cases, the legal position represented by SAMO will be approved ex ante by an official of the 
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national administration. Such an approval may come from the State Secretary of the Ministry 
of National Development, from the Minister or from the Head of Government. 
SAMO has further duties in administering the system which includes the compiling of 
data for the annual report on state aid and for the State Aid Scoreboard published by the 
Commission. SAMO also formulates the Hungarian position in connection with measures 
proposed by the Commission in amendments regarded as appropriate to existing schemes and 
it plays a leading role in representing the national position in the processes for adopting new 
state aid legislation in the EU. SAMO is under obligation to keep aid grantors informed about 
the decisions concerning the recovery or the suspension of aid schemes or of individual aid 
assessed by Commission. SAMO monitors whether all necessary steps have been taken in the 
execution of such decisions. SAMO regularly publishes discussion papers on  state aid issues 
in the State Aid Law Journal. The journal is the primary Hungarian language source of State 
aid law. 
To inform Hungarian grantors of their rights and duties under EU state aid law and to 
offer a commentary on Hungarian procedural rules, SAMO in 2009 prepared a detailed 
guidance document called the Vademecum on State Aid Rules.
25
 Primarily, the Vademecum 
draws the attention of grantors to the typical errors in the interpretation and application of 
state aid rules. This is an important element of SAMO's compliance strategy in which 
particular emphasis is placed on helping grantors design EU compliance state aid measures. 
SAMO organises regular training for officials in central and local administration.
26
 Individual 
training sessions often address special topics or developments in the application of state aid 
law as requested by the civil servants working in the field. 
Currently, SAMO has 13 staff members which is going to be increased to 16 because 
of the heavy workload. Nine of the current positions are financed from EU Structural Funds. 
The case handlers working in those positions deal mainly with EU co-financed aid issues. 
More than half of the staff is a law graduate, the others are economists. SAMO operates as a 
unitary agency and it is not structured in units or departments. Except for simple cases, teams 
of two or three officials work together on the same dossier. Each case handler has a 
designated field of expertise (e.g. regional aid, training aid, employment aid), but all staff 
members are regularly called to work on cases from other areas. 
In administering cases, SAMO relies on the central electronic registry of the 
Hungarian Government. Currently, there is no electronic state aid registry of the opinions 
issued by SAMO. This is clearly detrimental to the transparency of SAMO's operation and the 
public is unable to access information regarding the number of cases closed as ‘not aid’ or 
exempted under the group exemption regulations. 
The most pressing challenges faced by the Office were identified by the Chief Advisor 
of SAMO as the following. 
 
The main challenges for us... is the lack of knowledge concerning State aid rules, especially in 
case of indirect forms of aids. In borderline cases when it is not clear whether it is a State aid 
measure or not, it is difficult to advise the potential aid grantor to notify or not to do that....If 
there is a change in the State aid rules..., it is not always easy to convince the aid grantors 
that it is their interest to modify the legislation as soon as possible. And of course, in the eyes 
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of the potential aid grantors/beneficiaries, we are the bad guys who are not always able to 
give direct answers whether a measure is containing aid or not...
27
 
 
The workload of SAMO is clearly indicated in the next graph concerning the number 
of cases investigated between 2006 and 2010.
28
 
 
 
 
The chart indicates that the scrutiny of calls for application under the group exemption 
regulation takes up a considerably large portion of the workload of SAMO.
29
  
Regarding the effectiveness of SAMO, it must be noted that so far the Commission 
initiated five ex post investigations of group exempted state aid in Hungary.
30
 In each case, 
the investigations were closed without formulating doubts regarding the lawfulness of the aid 
exempted under EU law by SAMO. The Commission has not conducted on-site monitoring of 
state aid control in Hungary. 
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In the control of state aid provision, SAMO fulfils a crucial role as the specialist 
knowledge required in state aid administration is absent within the central or local public 
administration. Clients are usually advised by the ‘big four’ consultancy firms or by the few 
law firms specialised in EU state aid law. The quality of notifications submitted to the 
Commission largely depends on the experience and special knowledge of the consultants aid 
beneficiaries are able to hire. 
In 2003, after the amendment of the Act on Public Finances it became obligatory to 
publish the name of the beneficiary, the amount of state aid, the subject of the contract and the 
location of the investment in the Official Journal of Hungary (Magyar Közlöny) or on the 
internet page of the grantor not later than 60 days after the decision granting the aid was 
made. The relevant information must be kept for at least 5 years after publication. The new 
Act on Freedom of Information formulates this obligation as follows. 
 
The name of the beneficiary, the objective of the funding, its amount, and data concerning the 
place of implementation of the funded programme regarding non-normative, specific, 
operational and development funding granted from the budget of the body undertaking public 
duties shall be published on the 60th day following decision and shall be safeguarded for 5 
years after publication.
31
 
 
A new super-agency created by the act, called Hungarian Authority for Data 
Protection and Freedom of Information, is responsible for monitoring the application and the 
enforcement of this provision. 
It should be noted that information about the acivities of SAMO is rather limited. Its 
web page does not contain substantial information about its activities. Unlike independent 
public bodies, SAMO has no obligation to publish an annual report as it is part of the Ministry 
of National Development. 
 
Finally some interim conclusions are drawn. As regards the legal framework 
regulation of this topic at the level of Government Decree is approriate. Given that SAMO is 
part of the public administration, its rights and duties are regulated by the Government. Under 
a different approach its tasks could have been allocated to an independent agency, for 
example the Hungarian Competition Authority that is a state administrative authority, 
independent of the Government. The advantage of being part of the central administration is 
that SAMO can react promptly and also informally to draft aid. It directly receives from and 
provides information to the Meetings of the Government and its preparatory assembly, the 
Meeting of the Ministers of State on state aid issues. Regulation of the Governmental Decree 
on the 30 days time-limit to close its procedure is superflous as state aid grantors usually need 
urgent advice on state aid issues. As regards the role of SAMO in the application of state aid 
law every source has confirmed that the notification of draft aid does not happen early 
enough. Late notification puts SAMO at a disadvantage and puts pressure on it for quick 
approval. 
According to the information available, SAMO has good relations within the public 
administration, with other Ministries, public bodies, and with the local administrations too. 
Among the public bodies, the National Development Agency and the Hungarian Development 
Bank take an active role in the allocation of state and EU resources. The National 
Development Agency bears responsability for allocation of resources in EU co-financed 
projects under the national development plan (called New Széchenyi Plan). Relationship with 
the Hungarian Development Bank (MFB) is very important as it a 100% state-owned public 
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undertaking. Through MFB the State implements its strategic decision in the economy. 
Relations with the local administration becomes more important with regard to regional aid 
covered by state aid schemes. Contacts with the Hungarian Central Bank are also frequent. 
Informal contact with SAMO via e-mails or telephone calls is an usual business.  
The role of SAMO in forming a preliminary opinion is rather reactive. Once 
professional/political decision within the public administration is taken about granting the aid, 
SAMO scrutinises the plan. By using its advisory role SAMO influences the decision-makers 
to a certain extent, but does not get involved in political decisions. In case the Commission 
has opened proceeding against Hungary, it represents the official position already taken by 
political decision-makers (depending on the importance of the case, decisions are taken on 
different ministerial or governmental levels). 
The activity and professional experience of SAMO was recognised by the Commission, for 
example in the press release related to the Hankook case. 
 
INDIVIDUAL COMMISSION DECISIONS ON AID GRANTED IN HUNGARY 
 
This section of the Chapter examines the relevant Commission decisions in the following 
structure. First, we discuss the cases on large, economically significant investment projects. 
They all involve the application of the Commission's Multi-sectoral framework on regional 
aid for large investment projects (Multi-sectoral Framework)
32
 and they are evaluated 
separately by the Commission from the rest of regional aid cases. The Member States are 
obliged to notify these measures under the Framework, and the assessment of the relevant aid 
measures, instead of focusing on the vague general concepts, follows the rather technical 
pathway of identifying relevant markets and market shares of the undertakings involved. 
Secondly, distinction between existing aid applicable after accession and new aid will be 
made, as it was crucial after 1 May, 2004, whether incompatible aid should be abolished or 
altered pro futuro, or it can be recovered from the beneficiary ex ante. The third subchapter 
will cover decisions where the market investor test was applied by the Commission. Finally, 
the application of state aid rules during the economic and financial crisis will be touched 
upon. 
 
Large investment projects 
 
Incoming foreign investment is administered in Hungary through the Hungarian Investment 
and Trade Agency.
33
 In case it manages to secure subsidy from the Hungarian Government 
SAMO will get involved in the negotiation process to ensure that the subsidy providers, for 
example the Ministry for National Economy or the National Development Agency, observe 
EU state aid rules. Before the final decision is taken by the Government, SAMO presents its 
opinion on the compatibility of the subsidy with state aid law. Subsidies falling under the 
scope of the EU state aid regime need to be notified to the EU Commission for approval that 
they do not jeopardize the operation of EU single market.  
 
The 2006 decision on the aid to Hankook Tire 
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The Commission decision
34
 authorized state aid of 92.6 million euros in the form of direct 
grants and a tax relief
35
 to Hankook Tire Hungary, the fully owned subsidiary of Korean 
based Hankook Tire Corporation to build a new tyre production plant in Dunaújváros. The 
area qualifies as an assisted area by virtue of Article 107(3)a TFEU with an applicable aid 
intensity ceiling of 50 per cent. It was expected that the investment will create 1500 new 
direct jobs as well as up to 750 additional indirect jobs. 
The Commission's decision to allow regional aid to large investment projects falling 
under point 24 of the Multi-sectoral Framework depends on the market power of the 
beneficiary before and after the investment and on the capacities created by the investment. 
To carry out the relevant tests, the Commission first has to provide appropriate product and 
geographic market definitions. In this case, the Commission instead of defining the product 
market as such decided to look at the data concerning the markets for original equipment and 
replacement tyres separately and taken together. The Commission also avoided defining the 
relevant geographical market but went on to examine compliance with point 24(a) of the 
Multi-sectoral Framework on the relevant product market at EEA-level. This, in principle, 
should give the smallest possible geographical market and thus the worst case scenario in case 
the aid. The Commission. thereafter, verified compliance with point 24(a) on the relevant 
product market at the worldwide level to make sure that its analysis covers all possible 
demarcations of the geographical market. 
The treatment of the aid in this case shows that the Commission prefers to investigate 
possible aid scenarios instead of defining precise product and geographical markets. The 
highest market share found using this approach was around 10 per cent which is far below the 
25 per cent regulated in the Multi-sectoral Framework. The capacity created by the project 
was established as less than 5 per cent of the size of relevant product market at EEA-level. 
The aid also met the other condition in the Multi-sectoral Framework that the aid beneficiary 
had to contribute at least 25 per cent level to the financing of the investment. The aid scheme 
was put into effect after the approval of the Commission with the obligation that the company 
maintains its investment for a minimum of five years. The Net Grant Equivalent of the aid 
was lower than the maximum aid intensity regulated under the Multi-sectoral Framework. 
The relevant press release of the Commission was not hesitant to praise the 
performance of SAMO in the procedure. It stated that 
 
The Commission has been able to clear the aid after an investigation lasting less than five 
months thanks to the high quality of the notification and excellent cooperation with the 
Hungarian authorities.
36
 
 
Soon after the opening of the new plant and the start of production new emerged 
alleging unfair dismissals of trade union activists who had complained that certain 
employment protection rules were not followed and wages were incorrectly calculated. The 
Hungarian Employment Office conducted investigations at the premises of the company and 
imposed fines for the breach of employment protection rules. The officials of the Government 
were quick to confirm that the implementation of the subsidy package is (also) conditional on 
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Hankook Tire Hungary observing Hungarian law.
37
 As a consequence of the irregularities, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour withdrew the 143 million HUF training aid from the 
company.
38
 
 
The 2007 decision on the aid to Mátrai Erőmű39 
 
The proposed aid was intended to subsidise the construction of a new increased capacity unit 
at Mátrai Erőmű for the production of electricity based using domestically mined lignite. The 
new unit was supposed to replace the old units at its existing electricity generation plant 
which had a low efficiency and damaging CO2 emissions. The investment project promised 
the creation of 80 new jobs and the continuation of 200 existing jobs which were threatened 
by the impending closure of the existing units. Since the aid amount exceeded the notification 
threshold of the Multi-sectoral Framework, compliance of the proposed aid with the 
Framework had to be assessed. 
In its decision, the Commission found that the investment aid to be paid out until 
2020, worth 47 million EUR in the form of a tax relief, was in line with the legal framework 
on regional aid for large investment projects. Aid intensity was compatible with the regional 
aid ceiling and the beneficiary’s market shares did not exceed the threshold of 25 per cent of 
the total market. The capacity increase created by the project was also found to be less than 5 
per cent of the size of relevant product market and the own contribution of Mátrai Erőmű to 
the investment was over 25 per cent of the eligible costs. 
The project and the decision of the European Commission was heavily criticised by 
environmental groups, especially the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).
40
 According to 
their opinion, lignite-based electricity production is unsustainable and it is one of the most 
polluting method to produce electricity. In 2010, the expansion project was cancelled by the 
owners of Mátrai Erőmű.41 The owners took into account the rate of return of the project, the 
increasing strictness of environmental standards in EU law and the requirements of EU 
climate change policy. 
 
The 2008 decision on aid to IBIDEN 
 
IBIDEN Hungary Gyártó Kft., the Hungarian subsidiary of IBIDEN Co. Ltd., which has its 
headquarters in Japan, produces ceramic substrates for Diesel Particulate Filters (DPFs) in 
Dunavarsány.42 The company was granted 9.56 million EUR in subsidy by the Hungarian 
Government for setting up a new manufacturing plant in Hungary. The Commission's 
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decision found the proposed aid incompatible with EU law.
43
 It established that the relevant 
product market covers only substrates for DPFs to be fitted in the exhaust systems of diesel 
passenger cars and light duty trucks. The Commission also established that the market share 
of IBIDEN in the DPF market in Europe substantially exceeds the 25 per cent threshold 
established in the Multi-sectoral Framework both before and after the investment. The high 
market share established for IBIDEN can be regarded as adequately reflecting the position of 
the company in the global DPF market. It is one of the two major filter substrate 
manufacturers in the world. The aid would have strengthened even more IBIDEN's leading 
position in this market. The Commission also took into account that IBIDEN had already 
received aid worth 29.73 million EUR in the form of a direct grant and a corporate income tax 
allowance on the basis of existing regional aid schemes and the proposed aid was intended to 
supplement that aid. As the new aid had not been paid out, there was no need to decide on its 
recovery. Wishlade noted that procedures under the Multi-sectoral Framework are quite rare 
in EU state aid practice.
44
 Since its introduction in 2002, until July 2007 a total of only 14 aid 
proposals were notified. Of these, in only one instance did the Commission open the 
investigative procedure, in the case of IBIDEN Hungary.
45
 
 
The 2009 decision on the aid to Mercedes-Benz 
 
The Commission decision
46
 authorised until 2017 a 111.5 million EUR aid to Mercedes-Benz 
Hungary, owned by Daimler AG, for the construction of a new can manufacturing plant for 
the production of two new passenger car models in the Dél-Alföld Region in Hungary, a 
disadvantaged area eligible for aid under Article 107(3)(a) TFEU. The aid was granted in the 
form of a cash grant and a corporate tax allowance.
47
 The company received further financial 
support for constructing railway access to the public railway network which amounted to 
around 0.8 million EUR. 
The compensation mechanism included in the subsidy scheme covering significant exchange 
rate fluctuations affecting the Hungarian currency was a new element in financing an 
investment project in Hungary. It was added to the notified aid package for the purpose of 
compensating Mercedes-Benz Hungary for possible significant adverse effects of HUF/EUR 
exchange rate fluctuations in the economic environment after the 2008 crisis. Most of the 
eligible investments costs of Mercedes-Benz Hungary will incur in EUR, therefore, state aid 
must be received in EUR expressed as a percentage of the present value of the eligible costs 
incurred in EUR. Working with EUR/HUF exchange rates is, however, unavoidable as 
according to the Hungarian legislation the aid amount and aid intensity must be calculated and 
paid in HUF. This entails determining state aid in HUF a priori on the basis of the eligible 
costs calculated at a ‘fixed’ exchange rate applicable at the time of the application for the aid. 
The mechanism provides compensation for a possible decrease in the aid amount in EUR 
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terms in a situation when the planned investment volume in EUR is achieved. These eligible 
cost amounts are cumulated over the lifetime of the project and their final sum is determined 
after completion of the investment. Any increase in the eligible costs in EUR terms will not be 
compensated.
48
 
... 
„ (57) The compensation mechanism ensures that the aid intensity remains the same as in a 
situation when both the eligible costs and the aid amount are fixed in EUR terms. ...Any 
increase in the eligible costs in EUR terms will not be compensated. It is also ensured that 
there is a "negative compensation" (i.e. a decrease in the aid amount in HUF) if eligible costs 
in HUF are lower than planned. Thus the mechanism applies in both ways ("positive" and 
"negative" compensation) to ensure that no one sided advantage occurs.”49 
 
The Commission considered that the mechanism does not involve any additional advantage 
for Mercedes-Benz Hungary and thus it does not constitute state aid. 
 Regarding the aid allocated for the railway infrastructure development element of the 
project, which infrastructure will remain in state ownership, the Hungarian Government put 
forward arguments against the selective nature of the measure. It claimed that market prices 
will be paid by either Daimler AG or a third party operator for the use of the railway tracks to 
the owner, and in case of a third party operator, Daimler AG would pay market prices for the 
services supplied. Furthermore, with respect to the granting of the future concession for the 
operation of the planned railway transport service the Hungarian authorities confirmed that 
the concession will be granted in accordance with the relevant principles of EU law, in 
particular the principles of equal treatment and transparency and access to the railway 
infrastructure will be charged at a rate compliant with the relevant EU legislation. The 
Commission classified the aid for the railway infrastructure as selective, because the new 
railway link, although it is open to all potential users, served only the company. This way 
Mercedes-Benz Hungary was relieved from costs which otherwise would be incurred by 
economic operators and, therefore, benefited from an economic advantage over its 
competitors. It was also held that the aid was likely to affect trade between Member States 
and it was also likely that competition would be distorted or threatened to be distorted in the 
single market. The Commission's conclusions are consistent with the considerable case law on 
aid for infrastructure development of infrastructure which has consistently held that aid for the 
construction of infrastructure which serves one company only will be found incompatible 
with EU state aid rules. 
Although the scheme was found to constitute state aid within the meaning of the 
Treaty, the measures were open to be exempted in line with the requirements of the Regional 
Aid Guidelines 2007-2013 concerning large investment projects
50
. The project was expected 
to create 2500 direct jobs and an additional 10.000 to 14.000 indirect jobs. In its examination 
of the market share and the capacity thresholds, the Commission found that the capacity 
increase generated by the project will remain below 5 per cent of the apparent consumption of 
the product concerned in the EEA and the company's market share will stand bellow the 25 
per cent threshold in each of the market segments concerned (small family cars, compact 
multi-purpose vehicles and the total passenger car market). 
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In a separate case, the Commission examined ex officio the acquisition of land in 2008 by 
Mercedes Benz Hungary for the construction of its new plant in the Dél-Alföld Region.51 
Since part of the land was in state ownership, the Commission suspected that its sale 
constituted state aid in the meaning of the Communication concerning aid elements in land 
sales by public authorities.
52
 After a thorough investigation, the Commission came to the 
conclusion that even if the conditions of the Communication were not met, the market 
economy investor principle applied as the state owned plots of land were sold at market value. 
Their price was freely negotiated between the parties. 
 
The investigation into the aid to Audi Hungaria
53
 
 
The procedure to authorise the aid proposed to be granted to the car manufacturer Audi 
Hungaria was initiated in 2009
54
 when Hungary notified the Commission of its intention to 
grant a subsidy to finance the installation of new high-tech engine production lines for new 
generation engines and engine components for a wide range of passenger car models. 
Hungary plans to finance 14.9 billion HUF of the 153.4 billion HUF project in the form of a 
direct grant and a tax allowance. The Commission's preliminary investigation revealed that in 
some markets of passenger cars the 25 per cent market share threshold will be exceeded. The 
Commission expressed doubts concerning whether certain groups of passenger cars as 
opposed to individual passenger car segments should be considered as the relevant product 
market. In its comments on the opening decision the Commission, Hungary informed the 
Commission on recent changes to the scope of the investment project. It argued that owing to 
these changes the threshold will not be exceed in any of the individual passenger car segments 
concerned, provided that the Commission calculated the market share on the basis of the 
global market data of the Volkswagen-Porsche Group. In this regard, it must be remembered 
that under the Regional Aid Guidelines the markets should normally be defined at the EEA 
level. Following these developments, in 2010 the Commission extended the initial opening 
decision asking for comments from the interested parties.
55
 In response, Hungary has 
withdrawn its notification in 2012 and the case was closed by the Commission.
56
  
 
The distinction between existing aid and aid applicable after accession 
 
The decision concerning the aid granted through Power Purchase Agreements 
 
In the 90s, Hungarian economic and energy policy sought to secure the modernization of 
infrastructure in the electricity sector by attracting foreign investors that were willing to make 
the required substantial investment. To this end, Hungary offered entering into long-term 
power purchase agreements (so called PPAs) in the electricity market under which the state 
owned electricity distributing monopoly, the Magyar Villamos Művek Zrt. (MVM) undertook, 
as single buyer, the obligation to buy a fixed quantity of electricity at a fixed price for a 
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certain period to supply to the retail market. These long-term PPAs guaranteed a predictable 
return on investment and the privatised power plants in Hungary entered into long-term PPAs 
with MVM.
57
 
In 2005, under EU state aid law the Commission initiated a procedure against the 
Hungarian PPA regime, which decision was challenged by Budapesti Erőmű, one of the 
economic operators affected. 
58
 In 2008, the Commission decided that the PPAs constituted 
state aid incompatible with the common market and that the aid had to be recovered from the 
beneficiaries.
59
 According to the Commission, the long-term agreements shielded the 
companies involved from commercial risk and thus put them in a more advantageous position 
on the market than that enjoyed by other market participants. Hungary was given a six month 
period to dismantle the PPA system from the date of the notification of the Commission's 
decision. It was also requested to recover the aid within ten months following same date.
60
 
The challenge by Budapesti Erőmű was dismissed by the General Court.61 The Court 
examined two questions. The first was about the nature of the aid, whether it was an existing 
or a new aid, the second concerned the compatibility of the aid with the common market. 
Regarding the first question, the Court had to determine whether the PPAs concluded before 
Hungary's accession constituted existing aid. In such an event, while the Commission is 
entitled to declare that the aid is contrary to the common market, it cannot ask the Member 
State concerned to recover that aid and the Commission's decision has only ex nunc effect. In 
the Hungarian case, the Court referred to Annex IV of the Accession Treaty which defines 
existing aid as follows: (1) aid measures put into effect before 10 December 1994, (2) aid 
measures listed in the Appendix to Annex IV to the Act of Accession, and (3) aid measures 
which prior to the date of accession were assessed by the state aid monitoring authority of the 
new Member State and found to be compatible with the acquis, and to which the Commission 
did not raise an objection on the ground of serious doubts as to the compatibility of the 
measure with the common market, pursuant to the interim procedure. 
The judgment declared that the PPA regime was new aid as it did not fall into either 
categories under the legal framework provided by Annex IV. It was clear from its wording 
that in the particular circumstances of EU enlargement a measure which was not regarded as 
state aid when it was introduced can subsequently become state aid under EU law. Annex IV 
also indicates that in such cases the aid must be regarded as new aid. This was confirmed by 
the Court when holding that ‘Any other conclusion would have the effect of rendering 
meaningless the desired objective of the authors of the Treaty [on accession].’62 With this 
reasoning, the General Court rejected to decide the case on the basis of the first sentence of 
Article 1(b)(v) of Regulation 659/1999 according to which existing aid is ‘aid which deemed 
to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did 
not constitute an aid, and subsequently become an aid due to the evolution of the common 
market and without having been altered by the Member State.’ On the same grounds, the 
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Court also rejected the argument that the Commission's interpretation is inconsistent with 
earlier case law. 
 
The 2008 decision on the aid to Postabank/Erste Bank 
 
The second case in which the Commission established that Hungary had granted state aid in 
breach of EU law was the Postabank/ Erste Bank case.
63
 The measure was notified by 
Hungary in September 2003
64
 and concerned the indemnity undertaken by Hungary in 2003 in 
the sale of Postabank. Postabank, the seventh largest commercial bank in Hungary in 2002, 
was saved from collapse in 1998 by government recapitalisation which made the state the sole 
shareholder. The bailout was intended to prepare the bank  for restructuring with a view to its 
eventual privatisation. After the first failure to sell Postabank, Erste Bank won the second 
open, transparent and non-discriminatory privatisation tender in 2003. In the tender 
procedure, the state offered all bidders the indemnity undertaking in question in the event of 
litigation concerning liabilities arising from litigation claims arising up to five years after the 
conclusion of the sale and purchase agreement. In a unilateral declaration, which was signed 
on 29 April 2004, Erste Bank established an overall cap on the payments payable by the 
Hungarian state, as laid down in the share purchase agreement, to Postabank's buyer in respect 
of threatened or unknown litigation claims and also narrowed the scope of the definition of 
risk in connection with unknown claims. 
As in the case of the electricity PPAs, the first question to be considered was whether 
the indemnity claim, as taken in 2003 and modified in 2004, can be qualified as a measure 
applicable after the date of Hungary's accession to the EU. The Commission considered that 
for a measure to qualify as applicable after accession it must be shown that it is liable to 
produce an additional benefit that was not known or not precisely known at the time when the 
aid was granted. In this respect, the relevant factor is the legally binding act by which the 
competent national authorities granted the aid. Individual measures are considered applicable 
after accession if the precise economic exposure of the state is not known on the date the aid 
is granted and still unknown on the date of accession. As stated in the decision initiating the 
procedure, with respect the indemnity undertaking and to further potential guarantees the 
following conditions have to be met in order for a measure to be considered no longer 
applicable after accession: 
(a) the risks are precisely defined and included in an exhaustive list closed by the date of 
accession; 
(b) there is an overall cap on the amounts payable; 
(c) the litigation relates to events that had already occurred by the date of the indemnity 
undertaking and not to any future events. 
In the procedure Hungary argued that the measure was no longer applicable after 
accession. In any event, the indemnity was a conventional commercial term in a sale and 
purchase agreement concluded under an open and competitive procedure in which a market 
price was paid for Postabank. They further stated that the measure did not in itself distort 
competition as the market price, which included the value of the indemnity undertaking, was 
paid in the course of a privatisation transaction and without the indemnity undertaking the 
privatisation of Postabank would not have succeeded. 
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 The Commission, relying on the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Accession 
concerning the qualification of aid as new aid after the date of accession, held that the 
question of aid being ‘applicable after accession’ is distinct from the question of whether a 
measure qualifies as aid (at any given relevant time) and its assessment is subject to distinct 
criteria. It found that the indemnity undertaken by the Hungarian Government in 2003 in 
order to facilitate the sale of Postabank was not defined precisely and it did not include an 
exhaustive and binding list of obligations finalised by the date of accession. The Commission 
considered that introducing a simple cap without listing (itemising) the specific events which 
might trigger the indemnity does not restrain the payment of the indemnity with sufficient 
rigour. 
 
The 2009 decision on tax deduction for intra-group interest 
 
As of January 2003, Hungary introduced new, favourable provisions for the taxation of net 
interest income between affiliated companies belonging to the same group. The measure was 
not notified to the Commission, and by a letter in November 2004 the Commission requested 
information regarding the taxation scheme from the Hungarian authorities. More than two 
years later, the Commission informed Hungary that it had decided to initiate a formal 
procedure in the matter.
65
 By a letter dated June 2009, the Hungarian authorities informed the 
Commission of their intention to abolish the scheme from 1 January 2010. As a result, in its 
2009 decision the Commission terminated its procedure.
 66
 
Originally, the Commission qualified the measure as new aid in its decision opening 
the formal procedure. The scheme allowed companies to claim as taxable income or expenses 
only 50 per cent of the balance of interest received from or paid to affiliated companies in the 
context of intra-group relations. This could mean that when a company based in Hungary has 
a positive balance of interest with its affiliated companies, only half of the interest is taxed. 
Also, when the affiliated company paying a net interest is based in Hungary, it is able to 
deduct only half of the amount from its taxable income. However, when the interest-paying 
affiliated company is located abroad, it is not subject to Hungarian tax rules. Therefore, it is 
able to deduct the whole balance of interest paid from its taxable income. The Commission 
also questioned that the scheme would constitute a general tax measure.
67
 Furthermore, it 
declared that the measure could not be considered as existing aid as it did not fulfil any of the 
conditions set out in the Treaty of Accession.
68
 It argued that ‘in case in its final decision the 
Commission confirms that the measure constitutes incompatible State aid, it would imply that 
the aid had been illegally granted since 1 January 2003. Recovery would therefore be 
requested as from the date of accession of Hungary to the EU.’69 
In reaching its conclusion that the measure in question does not qualify as existing aid, 
the Commission found that in the circumstances of the case the legal provisions of the Treaty 
of Accession were inapplicable and it proceeded following the rules set forth in Article 
1(b)(ii)-(v) of the procedural regulation (Council Regulation 659/1999)
70
 which defines what 
constitutes existing aid. In this regard, it held that neither of the exceptions listed in Article 1 
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would apply. Points (ii) and (iii) could not be applied because the measure had not been 
notified. Article 1(b)(v) was also found inapplicable as the measure in question could not be 
considered as becoming an aid due to the evolution of the market.
71
 
The Commission continued its decision by drawing parallels with the earlier decided 
cases concerning the Belgian Coordination Centres (BCC) scheme. In 1984 and 1978, two 
Commission decisions of 1984 and 1987 ruled that a similar Belgian scheme dealing with 
intra-group taxation, which was applicable exclusively to multinational companies, was not 
aid. In the procedure, Hungary pointed out that SAMO had examined the measure prior to its 
adoption in the summer of 2002 and it decided not to notify the scheme to the Commission on 
the basis of the said jurisprudence concerning the BCC scheme. At the time it was put into 
effect, it was not self-evident that the measure in question constituted state aid.
72
 The 
Commission explicitly considered this point. 
 
Despite the fact that the measure did constitute State aid at the time it was implemented, the 
Commission considers that due to the very specific circumstances of the case at hand, in 
particular the pre-accession context and the previous Commission decisions in 1984 and 
1987 on the Belgian scheme, the Hungarian State Aid Monitoring Office had no reason to 
consider that the measure constituted aid in the sense of Article 87, paragraph 1, of the 
Treaty, especially since the measure was adopted before the Commission reconsidered its 
position on the Belgian scheme. It is therefore considered that there is a body of exceptional 
circumstances suggesting that the Hungarian authorities may have been misled in thinking 
that the measure did not constitute State aid in a pre-accession context. In such 
circumstances, at the time the measure was adopted, Hungary had valid reasons not to submit 
the measure to the Commission as provided for under the interim mechanism procedure.
73
 
 
 The Commission's decision, which found that the measure was state aid in the 
meaning of the Treaty, is legally questionable. It declined to follow the provisions of the Act 
of Accession or of the Procedural Regulation and decided, without  identifying a legal basis, 
referring to the very specific circumstances of the case, that the aid in question qualifies as 
existing aid. This was a clear signal from the Commission that similar aid measures are 
prohibited, although their recovery may not be ordered as it happened in the Hungarian case. 
The Commission could have interpreted Article 1(b)(v) of the Procedural Regulation, and the 
Treaty of Accession as well, in a manner that the evolution of the market would also involve 
evolution of the interpretation of state aid law. These solutions were rejected clearly in order 
to avoid creating ‘precedent’ for similar cases. 
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The application of the market economy investor test in Hungarian state aid cases 
 
The PPA scheme 
 
In the Power Purchase Agreements case before the General Court, the compatibility of the aid 
scheme with the common market was examined under the market investor test. The question 
was whether Budapesti Erőmű could have negotiated equally favourable contractual terms if 
the other party to the contract had been a buyer acting on a commercial basis instead of 
MVM. The General Court found that the conditions generated under the PPA scheme does not 
correspond to the conditions of the European wholesale market in the energy sector. On that 
market, the amount of energy sold and the expected sale price depend on the amount of 
energy sought which constantly fluctuates. Thus, by having undertaken the obligation to buy 
fixed quantities of electricity irrespective of actual demand for that product at any given time, 
MVM run a serious risk of being contractually bound to buy excessive quantities of electricity 
and suffering losses on resale as a result. A private operator in a comparable situation on the 
market would not have taken such a risk.
74
 Therefore, as suggested by the Commission, the 
PPA regime enabled economic operators in the Hungarian electricity market to enjoy 
economic advantages which they would not have been able to obtain in a competitive market. 
The Court also rejected the applicant's argument that the return on investment enjoyed 
by market operators should be regarded as consideration for the guarantee given by the PPA 
regime in relation to the sale of electricity and, therefore, it should qualify as a benefit 
enjoyed by MVM when the test of a private operator in a market economy is applied. MVM's 
commercial objective was to supply the regulated segment of the Hungarian electricity retail 
market at the lowest prices. It must be noted, as the Commission did, that in a normal 
transaction between a generator and a buyer of electricity the commercial risks linked to the 
operation of a power plant are generally borne by the operator of that plant. It was not 
established that MVM had an interest in bearing the risk associated with power generation 
assets and that the relevant risks at any given time would have to be transferred to MVM. 
Furthermore, while the PPA regime could be regarded as serving legitimate energy policy 
objectives, such as attracting investment in the Hungarian electricity market, this 
circumstance does not preclude the PPA regime from conferring an advantage on investors. 
The policy rationale underpinning an aid measure are immaterial for the purposes of 
determining whether the measure concerned constitutes aid in the meaning of the Treaties.
75
 
The argument that the PPA regime should be conceived as compensation for the 
provision of a service of general economic interest was also treated unfavourably in the 
judgment because there was no evidence confirming that a service of economic general 
interest defined accurately in advance was entrusted on the applicant. 
The General Court approved the methodology used by the Commission to ensure the 
recovery of the incompatible aid. The Commission stated in its decision that the amount of 
state aid depended on the price and amount of electricity which could have been produced and 
sold on the Hungarian wholesale market between 1 May 2004 and the date of the termination 
of the PPA regime. On this ground, the Commission required Hungary to calculate the exact 
amount to be recovered on the basis of a simulation of the wholesale electricity market as it 
would have stood without the long-term PPAs being in force. 
The Commission's decision was openly criticized by Leigh Hancher.
76
 She argued that given 
that the Commission limited its assessment to the period after 1 May 2004 it failed to consider 
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whether the business case for the PPA regime might have been different in the mid-1990s and 
whether at that time the regime indeed met the commercial objectives of MVM. She claimed 
that ‘surprisingly, even taking 2004 as the starting point, the Commission failed to consider 
the disadvantages for buyers relying on spot markets and short term contracts- that is 
exposure to volatility and liquidity risk’77 and that ‘...its approach in the PPA cases certainly 
represents a departure from the established jurisprudence as summarised and confirmed once 
more by the Court in West LB
78
 - that the application of the MEIT [market economy investor] 
test should be made at the time when the investment was made, and not with the benefit of 
hindsight.’79 
Up until 2012, no aid was recovered from Budapesti Erőmű and in the meantime the 
Commission authorised some of the aid addressing the so-called sunk costs of the company
80
. 
In case T-352/08, Pannon Hőerőmű applied for the annulment of the Commission decision, 
but later withdrew its application as Alpiq Csepel Erőmű did.81 Two other PPA related 
proceedings are still pending before the General Court. The Commission's decision was also 
challenged in an action for annulment by Dunamenti Erőmű in case T-179/09, and in T-
468/08 AES-Tisza Erőmű that are in progress since April 2009.82 
 
The 2010 decision on compensation for stranded costs in the Hungarian electricity market 
 
At the end of 2009, the Hungarian authorities notified the Commission of a scheme 
compensating stranded costs in the Hungarian electricity market. In 2010, the Commission 
authorised the aid scheme holding that the compensation of economic operators in the power 
generation market for certain costs resulting from the termination of the long term PPA 
regime does not exceed what is necessary to recoup the shortfall in investment costs 
repayment over the lifetime of the relevant assets, including a reasonable profit margin.
83
 The 
Commission was satisfied that the compensation scheme was in line with its Communication 
relating to the methodology for analysing state aid linked to stranded costs.
84
 The three 
beneficiaries of the scheme are Budapesti Erőmű, Dunamenti Erőmű and Pannon Hőerőmű. 
The compensation is deducted from the amounts of aid to be recovered from these 
undertakings under the Commission decision on the PPA regime. 
 The Commission's approach is in line with its general policy in the EU electricity 
market which recognized as early as 2001 that economic operators will not be able to recover 
some of their investments made before the opening up of electricity markets after 
liberalization. In its Communication on stranded costs it accepted that Member States may 
grant aid in order to finance losses caused by investments or contracts that were made 
economically unviable by liberalization. In the Hungarian case, the Commission found that 
the costs taken into account by Hungary for the calculation of the compensation were eligible 
for aid, in particular, because they concerned investments in assets that became non-
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economical as a result of the liberalization of the Hungarian electricity market. It also 
accepted that the revenues generated by the relevant investments and the aid previously 
received have all been deducted from the cost amount taken into account for the calculation of 
the compensation, and as a result there was no risk of over-compensation.
85
 
The Commission made it clear that the notified scheme and the execution of the 
recovery requirement contained in the PPA decision must be carried out simultaneously. This 
means that the economic operators affected instead of receiving payments from the Hungarian 
state will be liberated from part of their obligation to repay the amount indicated in the PPA 
decision. Until 2012, no aid was recovered as the aid approved by the Commission was higher 
than the aid found incompatible with the Treaties. 
 
The implementation of the PPA and the stranded costs decisions 
 
In 2007, the Government issued a decision concerning the termination or modification of the 
PPA regime. MVM terminated its long-terms contracts with Paksi Erőmű, Pécsi Erőmű and 
Mátrai Erőmű in 2007 and began negotiations with the two largest market participants, 
Dunamenti Erőmű and Tiszai Erőmű. To prepare for all eventuality, Act LXX of 2008 stated 
that in case the issues regarding individual PPAs cannot be settled in negotiations between the 
parties as required by Article 3, the contract concerned will be terminated by virtue of the 
power of that act. This took place in regards the PPA concluded with Budapesti Erőmű. In 
order to dissolve any doubts regarding the constitutionality of the act, the explanations 
attached to the act contain a detailed reference to the case law of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court on the limitations of the right to freedom of contract. 
The Hungarian Energy Office was made responsible for calculating the stranded costs 
of the electricity producers affected and the recoverable state aid under Act LXX of 2008. The 
obligation to recover the incompatible state aid is contained in Article 4 of the Act which also 
refers to the methodology approved by the European Commission. The 2008 Act already 
made it possible to deduct the stranded costs of the electricity producers concerned from the 
aid to be recovered, even though the final decision of the Commission was taken only on 27 
April 2010. 10 days after the Commission's decision, the Hungarian Energy Office calculated 
and published the final amounts which had to be recovered to the State Treasury. The 
companies, as regulated by the 2008 Act, were given 60 days to pay the amount calculated by 
the Office, otherwise the Office under statutory obligation would inform the National Tax and 
Customs Authority to enforce the payment under tax law. Until the publication of this 
Chapter, none of the companies involved were put under an obligation by the Energy Office 
to repay the state aid. The starting point of the 60 day deadline was determined, as stipulated 
by the Act, in a decision of  the Minister of Finance identifying the exact date on which the 
European Commission issued its stranded cost decision.
86
 A separate government decree 
(Decree No 149/2010) contained detailed rules on the methodology of calculating the amount 
of the incompatible state aid under the PPA regime and the stranded costs found compatible 
with EU law. 
Parallel to the procedures under EU state aid law, several of the companies affected 
initiated proceedings against the Hungarian State at the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) alleging the violation of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty. The 
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case of AES-Tisza Erőmű was closed with the award that the respondent did not breach the 
Energy Charter Treaty.
87
 
 
The Postabank case 
 
In the case concerning the sale of Postabank, the existence of an advantage was assessed by 
the Commission with reference to the nature of the measure both in isolation from previous 
measures taken by the state and in connection with those measures. The results of both 
exercises were identical and they confirmed that the indemnity undertaking by the Hungarian 
state provided an advantage for the buyer of Postabank. The Commission's assessment had to 
take into account the circumstances at the time when the privatization decision was made. The 
Commission did not question the way Postabank was privatised and it acknowledged that it 
was sold to the highest bidder in an open and competitive tender procedure. However, this 
fact was not sufficient to exclude that the buyer was provided an advantage from the state. 
 The Commission argued, among others, that 
 
First, at the time of the conclusion of the share purchase agreement, the indemnity 
undertaking for unknown claims was not capped. When the Hungarian Government sold 
Postabank, it committed public money under the measure to the buyer of Postabank to an 
unlimited extent. The Commission, therefore, considers that... a prudent private seller in the 
present case would not have given a commitment of an unlimited size to cover payment 
obligations arising from unknown claims up to five years after the conclusion of the share 
purchase agreement, even if the provision of the indemnity undertaking resulted in a higher 
sales price than the price the seller would have obtained by selling Postabank without this 
undertaking. The Commission considers that a market economy seller selling Postabank 
would have at least included a ceiling in the sale contract limiting the potential payment to 
the purchaser under the indemnity. A market economy seller would not have accepted running 
the risk of having to pay an unlimited amount, even in the knowledge that the likelihood of 
such a high payment was very low. Therefore, the fact that at the time of the privatisation no 
ceiling was put on the indemnity shows that the State did not behave in the same way as a 
market economy operator.
88
 
 
The Commission's conclusion was not altered by the fact that the bidders considered 
the measure to be an indispensable condition of the privatisation deal. It is likely that without 
the indemnity undertaking for unknown litigation claims the privatization of Postabank would 
have been unsuccessful. However, the Hungarian state should have considered introducing a 
less generous indemnity undertaking covering only the value of the business instead of an 
unlimited future amount.  Limiting the indemnity undertaking would have been a reasonable 
decision in a competitive market and it would have been in line with the market economy 
investor principle. 
 The measure was also examined under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.
89
 
Since indemnity was given in a time when Postabank was no longer an undertaking in 
difficulty, the Guidelines were unable to support the measure and ultimately, the Commission 
ordered its termination with retroactive effect from 30 April 2004. However, no recovery was 
necessary as no payments had actually been made to Erste Bank under the indemnity 
undertaking. 
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In principle, the Commission could have asked for a charge to be levied for the indemnity 
undertaking for the purpose of offsetting the advantage offered by the measure. However, the 
Commission accepted the argument that levying such a charge could contravene the principle 
of legal certainty having regard to the specific circumstances in which the guarantee was 
given. Its enforcement and its value depended almost entirely on unforeseen events and 
circumstances. Moreover, despite the objective character of the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty of Accession, the Commission's guidelines on the concept of applicability after 
accession with regard to guarantees and indemnity undertakings from the state were only 
gradually clarified over time. On the basis of the Treaty of Accession alone, it was unclear 
what criteria the Commission would apply in the assessment of applicability after accession in 
the case of measures the application of which depends on future events. The applicable 
criteria were communicated to the candidate countries in the form of guidance letters. In the 
letter received by the Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the EU, the Commission 
clarified its understanding of the concept of ‘applicable after accession’ in respect of 
individual aid measures only. It did not explicitly address the assessment of indemnity 
undertakings, nor did it explicitly require itemisation as a criterion for the indemnity 
undertaking not to be considered applicable after accession, namely that the risks should be 
precisely defined and included in an exhaustive list closed by the date of accession. 
 The further formal guidance on this matter followed only after the 20 October 2003 
purchase of Postabank subject to the said indemnity undertaking by the Hungarian state. The 
Commission's formal decisions of 28 January 2004 on Česká Spořitelna and of 16 December 
2003 on Komerční Banka90 stated that the Commission considers individual aid measures to 
be applicable after accession if the precise economic exposure of the state is not known on the 
date the aid is granted. In neither of these cases was any mention made of any itemisation 
requirement. The specific itemisation requirement in the Postabank case was only brought to 
Hungary's attention by the Commission in a letter dated 19 March 2004 addressing 
specifically the post-accession applicability of the indemnity undertaking. Therefore, the 
Commission found unreasonable to require recovery in respect of aid that was granted at a 
time when the Commission's guidelines on the post-accession applicability criteria for 
indemnity undertakings had not been fully clarified and may have given the misleading 
impression of the Commission's approach being complete.
91
 In these circumstances, it 
remains questionable whether the Commission's treatment of Hungary's conduct in the 
Postabank case was legally sound altogether. Neither Hungary, nor Erste Bank sought the 
annulment of the Commission decision. 
 
The 2010 decision on the aid to MOL 
 
In November 2007, the Commission received a complaint regarding an alleged state aid 
measure in favour of the Hungarian national oil and gas company MOL. This happened in a 
period when MOL was under attack in a hostile takeover. The measure in question is an 
agreement dating back to 2005 between MOL and the Hungarian government according to 
which MOL's mining royalty payments on extracted hydrocarbons remain fixed for the 
majority of its hydrocarbon mining fields until 2020. For all other operators, the mining fee 
was increased considerably by an amendment of the Hungarian Mining Act in early 2008. The 
extension agreement was subject to the payment of considerable mining fees, because the 
extraction of the fields concerned was delayed. In the Commission's view, the combined 
effect of the prolongation agreement and the subsequent modification of the Mining Act 
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exempted MOL from taxes which were payable by its competitors and thus MOL enjoyed an 
unfair competitive advantage in the market.
92
 
 The Commission argued that 
 
In the framework of the authorisation regime, the extension agreement is clearly selective. 
Indeed, as the Hungarian authorities themselves confirm, the parties, when negotiating the 
terms of this agreement, have a certain margin of manoeuvre to stipulate the different 
payment components and, more importantly, may even decide not to conclude the agreement 
at all. Thus, the Hungarian authorities had the discretion to conclude such an agreement with 
MOL (or with any other market participant).
93
 
 
The Hungarian state was unable to justify such a discriminatory treatment through the 
logic and nature of the Hungarian mining regulatory system. Mining fees are imposed on 
economic operators to secure revenues for the State from mining activities on the extracted 
value. In contrast, the payments made under the prolongation agreement incurred as an extra 
charge in exchange for concluding the prolongation agreement. The special arrangements 
enjoyed by MOL led to the situation that while MOL, having failed to commence production 
on time, was guaranteed to benefit from lower mining fees until 2020 in all of its fields under 
authorisation, its competitors, which are equally subject to the authorisation regime and which 
started production on time and, therefore, were not interested in obtaining a prolongation of 
their rights, were required to pay higher statutory fees.
94
 
The Commission did not accept Hungary's view that the fees paid by MOL for the 
prolongation agreement should be deducted from the amount of state aid received by the 
company calculated as the difference of the fee payable under the prolongation agreement and 
the fee chargeable under the modified Mining Act. The Commission argued that the fees were 
paid in exchange for concluding the prolongation agreement and not for the right of having 
lower fees than those imposed on MOL's competitors. The Commission made reference to the 
case law of the EU Court according to which aid cannot be offset by a specific and distinct 
charge imposed on the same company without a link to the measure constituting aid. This 
principle was confirmed by the EU Court of Justice in 2011 in its judgment France Télécom95 
where it held that a measure cannot be saved from categorisation as aid where the aid 
beneficiary is subject to a specific charge which is different from and unconnected with the 
aid in question. 
The Commission's decision declared the whole measure incompatible with the internal 
market and ordered its recovery. In 2010, MOL repaid the aid,
96
 but the decision was 
challenged before the General Court.
97
 In 2013, the General Court upheld the pleas presented 
by MOL and annulled the decision
98
. The Court considered that, where a Member State 
concludes with an economic operator an agreement which does not involve a State aid 
element, the fact that, subsequently, conditions external to such an agreement change in such 
a way that the operator is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis other operators that have not 
concluded a similar agreement is not a sufficient basis on which to conclude that, together, the 
agreement and the subsequent modification of the conditions external to that agreement can 
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be regarded as constituing State aid.
99
 In other words, the valid agreement concluded between 
MOL and the State cannot be considered selective because Mol was the only mining company 
concluding such a contract and later modification of Hungarian law has raised the mining fee 
for the rest of the operators. The Court went on to examine whether the terms of the 
agreement (for example duration and fee rate) were proposed selectively by the State to one or 
more operators rather than on the basis of objective criteria laid down by law.
100
 The Court 
came to the conclusion that no evidence of unjustified preferential treatment of the applicant 
is apparent from the decision. 
101
 The judgement of the General Court was appealed by the 
Commission.
102
 
 
The 2012 decision on the aid to Malév 
 
In 2012, the European Commission found that the financing granted to the Hungarian flag 
carrier Malév Hungarian Airlines between 2007 and 2010 in the context of its privatisation 
and renationalisation constitutes incompatible state aid as Malév would not have been able to 
obtain similar financing from the market on the terms conceded by the Hungarian 
authorities.
103
 Hungary was obliged to implement the Commission's decision within four 
months following its date of notification. After several unsuccessful attempts at privatisation, 
in 2007 Hungary concluded a sales agreement with AirBridge Zrt concerning the majority 
ownership of Malév. Following press reports and information by a complainant about 
Hungary's intention to re-nationalise the company, the Commission opened in December 2010 
an in-depth investigation scrutinising the following measures: 
a) the takeover in December 2007 of a 76 million EU loan granted to Malév in 2003; 
b) a de facto cash facility in the context of the abortive sale of Malév's Ground Handling 
subsidiary amounting to 4.3 billion HUF; 
c) a tax and social security debt deferral in the amount of 13.8 billion HUF; 
d) two capital increases of 25.4 billion HUF in February 2010 and 5.7 billion HUF in 
September 2010; 
e) shareholder loans granted between May and September 2010 totalling 14.9 billion HUF; 
f) the conversion of part of these shareholder loans together with the interest owed into shares 
of Malév in September 2010. 
During the procedure, the Hungarian Government tried to defend these measures 
under the market economy investor and market economy creditor principles. In relation to the 
measures accompanying the sale of Malév to Airbridge, Hungary claimed that these measures 
are market conform because they are supported by the collateral put in place to secure the 
taking over of the loan by the state asset management company, Magyar Vagyonkezelő Kft. 
As to the abortive sale of Malév Ground Handling, they argued that no advantage was 
conferred on Malév as the late reimbursement of the sale price was correctly collateralised 
and that due interest was charged on the sale price. With regard to the tax deferrals, the 
argument was that such arrangements constitute general measures under state aid law. In 
relation to the shareholder loans and their subsequent transformation into shares in Malév, 
Hungary suggested no advantage was conferred on Malév as the loans were fully secured 
against assets, market conform interest rates were applied and in the transformation process 
all interests due were fully taken into account. Hungary did not dispute the findings of the 
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Commission relating to the use of state resources and imputability, effect on trade and 
distortion of competition. In case of the tax deferral, although the selectivity of the measure 
was disputed, the Commission rejected the arguments on the ground that the deferral 
arrangement was a discretionary solution and could have been refused by the parties involved. 
The main issue in the debate between the Commission and Hungary was whether the 
abovementioned measures conferred advantage on Malév. The European Commission first 
assessed the totality of the measures and then made an assessment of each measure 
individually. The individual measures were not considered as autonomous as they constituted 
elements of a single process. As to the application of the market economy investor and 
creditor test, the Hungarian authorities themselves admitted that there was no private investor 
which would have been willing to take over the airline at the relevant time. The Commission 
assumed that in similar circumstances no private investor would have acted like the 
Hungarian government. In light of Malév's critical financial results over a long time period, 
also supported by the claim from the Hungarian authorities claim that the airline had been in 
permanent difficulty at least since 2006, it was likely that Malév could only have produced a 
return acceptable to a private investor if the company had undergone drastic restructuring. 
Neither Hungary, nor Malév ever demonstrated that any of the measures introduced were part 
of such a restructuring plan.
104
 The Commission's investigation concluded that Malév, given 
its consistently difficult financial situation, would have been unable to secure the required 
financing on the market on the terms conceded by Hungary, or in fact in any other terms. 
Under EU law, a company in difficulty may receive state aid subject to the strict 
conditions set in the 2004 EU Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.
105
 This was not the case 
here, because Malév could not demonstrate how its operation would become viable again 
under its existing business model. Malév's business plan contained no evidence that a private 
source would be drawn in to finance the cost of restructuring and the plan contained no 
compensatory measures to minimise the competition distortions brought about by the 
significant state support. The position of Malév was worsened by the aid received in the years 
preceding the introduction of the investigated measures. 
At the end of January 2012, the Government declared Malév as a major economic operator of 
preferential status for strategic considerations.
106
 This was based on the controversial 
modification of the Act on Bankruptcy and Liquidation Proceedings which enabled the 
application of special rules in the liquidation of companies deemed strategically important by 
the Hungarian government.
107
 Under the act, economic operators classified in a decree as 
major economic operators of preferential status for strategic considerations
108
 to whom the 
following criteria apply: 
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a) settlement of the debts of such operators, composition with creditors or reorganization is in 
the interest of the national economy or is of particular common interest, or 
b) the winding up of such operators without succession-where the lack of funding and 
insolvency cannot presumably be resolved- in a simplified, transparent and standardized 
procedure is given priority due to economic considerations. 
 
On 3 February 2012, Malév ceased its activities109 and on 14 February 2012 it went into 
liquidation. Shortly after, under the new provisions a state liquidator was appointed by the 
Government.
110
 
 
As an interim conclusion, we would like to highlight the following:  
The obligation to notify draft aid was no always complied with by the State. With regard to 
the large investment projects (Mercedes-Benz, Audi, Opel, Hankook, Mátrai Erőmű, 
IBIDEN) the draft aid was notified to the Commission under the Multisectoral Framework on 
regional aid for large investment projects. In other cases under investigation, the Commission 
has opened most of the proceeding against Hungary ex officio, because the measure was not 
notified. A complaint was received by the Commission in two cases, namely MOL and 
MALÉV. Given the fact, that both companies are present on competitive markets, it was not 
surprising that competitors whistleblowed the Hungarian State in Brussels. With regard to the 
aid to MALÉV, Hungarian authorities may have thought that notification was undesirable 
given the high chance of rejection. Borderline cases (PPAs, tax deduction for intra-group 
interest) where the exact meaning of the EU law was missing, were not notified either. 
Hungary failed to notifiy aid to financial institutions too as we will see at the end of the 
following chapter. 
Negative decisions have always been implemented timely and entirely in Hungary. The 
implementation of a Commission decision has caused the liquidation of MALÉV, the national 
flag-carrier airline company. The execution of the Commission’s decision has been and is still 
very complex in the case of compensation of aid with regard to PPAs and stranded costs, 
requiring special knowledge and dedicated legislation. Thus, an Act of Parliament and a 
Governmental decree set out the rules for the calculation of the exact amount of state aid and 
the responsibilities of the Hungarian Energy Office. The State has abolished the law on tax 
deduction for intra-group interest before the Commission closed its proceeding, which ended 
with a decision on the incompatibility of the law with the internal market. Even MOL has 
repaid the illegal aid nothwithstanding its application for the annullment of the decision at the 
General Court. No particular problems have emerged concerning the ex post monitoring 
activity
111
 of the Commission either. No infringement proceedings have been brought against 
Hungary in the field of state aid either. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
national and international trade and employment, or for reasons of supplying district heat and other 
public utility services to the general public, 
b.) that is involved in the implementation of projects given priority for national economy considerations, 
c.) that is involved in discharging public functions conferred by law nation-wide, 
d.) that received large amounts of State aid for restructuring, credit guarantees, surety facilities or export 
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under contract with the State or specific public bodies (including the State-owned economic operators 
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It is noteworthy that there are two interesting reoccurring issues discussed in the Hungarian 
cases. One is the definition of existing aid and aid applicable after accession within the 
meaning of the Accession Treaty. The other one is evolving case-law. 
Concerning the question of existing aid, in the PPAs, Postabank, and tax reduction cases, the 
Commission had to decide whether the aid is existing or new. Indeed, it was crucial for the 
companies to show that aid is an exising one. With respect to existing aid, the Commission’s 
negative decision has only ex nunc effect, therefore already granted aid shall not be recovered.  
During earlier accessions, the EU followed a different concept. With regard to accessions 
before 2004, all aid granted before accession was considered as old or existing. The opposite 
approach was followed in 2004, namely all aid which is not enlisted as existing, is considered 
as new. This change was motivated by the fact that the Commission had fears that the 
candidate countries arrive into the Union with too much incompatible aid.
112
 The General 
Court has ruled that the only relevant legal framework in this instance is the Treaty of 
Accession.  As to the question of aid applicable after Accession, the Postabank case is among 
the first to set out the rules with regard to aid measures in the form of guarantees.  
The Treaty of Accession defines its applicability to any measure still applicable after the date 
of accession that constitute State aid and do not fall within the category of existing aid. These 
measures are deemed to be new aid on accession and the Commission has full powers to 
prohibit their application and to order recovery of any sums unlawfully paid after accession. 
According to the Commission, the question of aid being ‘applicable after accession’ is a 
distinct question from the question of whether a measure qualifies as aid (at any given 
relevant time) and is subject to distinct criteria. 
The Commission has clarified its position with regard to guarantees applicable after accession 
a few days before the Treaty of Accession came into force, when Postabank has already been 
sold to Erste Bank. In the period between the signature of the Accession Treaty and its 
coming into force, the so-called interim procedure applied. As SAMO could have not used 
that procedure within the limited time-frame, the Commission created a situation whereby 
legal certainty deemed to be violated. For this reason, the Commission failed to charge a levy 
for the indemnity undertaking in order to offset the advantage of the measure. 
Almost the same problem occurred one year later in the proceeding concerning tax deduction 
for intra-group interest. The proceeding was closed more than five years after the first 
information request was sent to Hungary. The measure was qualified as new aid under the 
Treaty of Accession in the decision to initiate formal proceedings in 2007, but the opposite 
view was taken two and a half years later. In the final decision the Commission defined the 
measure as existing, but not under the meaning of the Accession Treaty or the meaning of the 
procedural regulation. The measure was definied as existing aid without legal basis after 
reference was made to the exceptional circumstances of the case. SAMO did not apply the 
interim procedure because, after examination, it found no compatibility problems. 
In this way the Commission could send a signal to the Member States that similar aid 
measures are prohibited, but did not have to order recovery of the incompatible aid from the 
Hungarian beneficiaries. Another advantage of this solution was that the Commission avoided 
to make a „precedent” for later cases. 
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The relatively high number of cases where the Commission has applied the private investor 
test or its variations is a common feature. Cases in PPAs, Postabank, Mercedes-Benz land 
acquisition, MALÉV, FHB Bank have been decided under this „economic” test where 
outcomes are more or less difficult to predict. It has been more predictable in the case of 
MALÉV, where considerable case-law already existed for the sector, and less predictable for 
exemple in case of the long-term power purchase agreements.   
 
Although the examination of the social effects of state aid decisions is not the subject of 
this article, we can note that decisions on grants have been increasingly followed by the press. 
Most of the cases has triggered a social/environmental/economic debate in society about the 
role of the State in a market economy. In the Hankook case, the press reported and heavily 
criticised the behaviour of the company towards its employees and trade union activists. The 
large amount of state aid was compared with the positive effects of the new plant on 
employment and on the economy. Probably under the pressure of public opinion, officials of 
the Government have reiterated that implementation of the contract with the company is (also) 
conditional on the observance of Hungarian law. Withdrawal of aid already contracted has 
never happened, to the best of my knowledge, as Hungary is very keen on attracting foreign 
investments. In case of Mátrai Erőmű environmental groups were active in drawing public 
attention to the environmental effects of the decision and an open debate has started on the 
environmental effects of investment aid to Hankook. As a result of the liquidation of 
MALÉV, a couple of thousand workers have lost their jobs. Economic and social implications 
of the closure of the Hungarian flag carrier are considarable. 
 
The application of the EU temporary rules established in response to the post-2008 
financial and economic crisis 
 
In 2008-2009, the Commission adopted a Temporary State Aid Framework to enable Member 
States to deal with the problems of the financial and economic crisis affecting the financial 
system and to support access to finance for real economy firms.
113
 The Temporary 
Framework, which was to operate until 2010, was extended through 2011 and finally expired 
in December 2011. It was based on Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty (currently 107(3)(b) 
TFEU) which permits aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. 
In February 2009, the Commission gave its authorisation to the Hungarian temporary scheme 
to grant aid of up to 500.000 EUR and to offer reduced-interest loans covering undertakings 
which started to face financial difficulties after 1 July 2008.
114
 
 
The 2010 decision on the aid to Péti Nitrogénművek 
 
In January 2009, the Hungarian Development Bank (Magyar Fejlesztési Bank, MFB) granted 
loans amounting to approximately 88 million EUR to Péti Nitrogénművek, a synthetic 
fertiliser producer, which in October 2008 stopped its production activity. The loan was 
supplemented by guarantees from the Hungarian government. The scheme was announced in 
December 2008 and it aimed to rescue the main supplier of the Hungarian market by 
providing funds to resume production and cover operation costs. According to the 
government, the aid would ensure the continuation of fertiliser production in Hungary and 
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secure the employment of the company's workforce. The measures were not notified, but soon 
after their introduction, the Commission opened its formal investigation procedure.
115
 
For the Commission, it was unclear whether the company was in genuine difficulty in 
the meaning of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.
116
 In such case, the Temporary 
Framework can be applied. In its decision, the Commission noted that despite the company's 
apparent liquidity problems, and as the evidence submitted by Hungary suggested, the 
company's total equity exceeded its registered capital, that it did not fulfil the criteria under 
domestic law for being the subject of collective insolvency proceedings, and that it had 
positive operating as well as net results for the entire 2008 year. On this basis, it was 
convinced that the conditions of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines were not fulfilled. 
The Commission had no difficulties with declaring that the measures constituted state 
resources and they were imputable to the state. In declaring the financing from the Hungarian 
Development Bank as involving the use of state resources, the Commission took into account 
the following circumstances.
117
 The Hungarian Development Bank is a state-owned financial 
institution, the operation of which is governed by statute, and it is entrusted with the special 
task of financing projects in the public interest, in particular to promote economic 
development in Hungary and to contribute effectively to the implementation of government 
economic and development policy. Its operation is subject to the special prudential rules laid 
down in statute, its share capital is owned by the Hungarian state and its shares are not subject 
to trading. Its liabilities may be covered by the state budget, and the upper limits of its lending 
and guaranteeing activities are regulated in law. Any dividends paid out go to the state budget. 
As to the imputability of the measures to the state, the Commission acknowledged that the  
ownership rights of the state in the bank are exercised by the competent minister and the bank 
reports annually to the competent minister about its operations. Its auditor is also appointed by 
the competent minister. The members and the chairperson of the management and supervisory 
boards, as well as the Chief Executive Officer, are appointed and dismissed by the competent 
minister.
118
 On this basis, the Commission held with reference to the conditions laid down in 
Stardust Marine
119
 that 
 
Although public control of an institution does not automatically render all the latter’s actions 
imputable to the State, in the case at hand the necessary conditions laid down by the ECJ 
obtain, suggesting that MFB’s behaviour is imputable to the State. MFB pursues public policy 
objectives, its legal status is governed by separate legislation, it is partially exempted from 
financial supervisory regulation and there is a high intensity of the supervision exercised by 
the public authorities over the management. In particular, the context in which the measures 
have been decided (i.e. a government decision issuing the guarantee explicitly for loans 
granted by the MFB and stipulating that the MFB can, in exchange, delegate two members to 
Nitrogénművek's board and preceded by public statements by the Government’s spokesperson 
announcing that the measures would be granted) shows that the Hungarian authorities must 
be regarded as having been involved in the adoption.
120
 
 
The Commission also examined whether the measures complied with the Regional 
Aid Guidelines.
121
 As the aid was granted for an investment which had been already 
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completed, and thus there was no incentive effect as required by the Regional Aid Guidelines, 
the aid was not exempted. The Commission found, however, that part of the aid was partly 
justified under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, specifically under the Temporary Framework.
122
 The 
Commission declared that the remuneration paid by the company was too low, and the 
difference between the remuneration Péti Nitrogénművek should have paid according to the 
Temporary Framework and the remuneration it actually paid must be repaid by the 
company.
123
 
On 22 July 2011, Nitrogénművek Vegyipari Zrt brought an action for the annulment of 
the Commission's Decision alleging the Commission's failure to apply the market transaction 
principle and that the decision violated the principle of legitimate expectations. It also claimed 
that Article 107(3)(b) TFEU
124
 and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
125
 
were violated. Case T-387/11 is still pending before the General Court. The General Court has 
dismissed all pleas presented by the company in 2013.
126
 
 
Aid in the financial sector 
 
The Commission approved several schemes affecting the damaged European financial sector. 
The Hungarian bank support scheme was accepted in February 2009
127
 and it is subject to 
approval every six months.
128
 The resources of the scheme come from the external support 
package provided jointly by the IMF, the EU and the World Bank in November 2008. The 
budget of the scheme is altogether 600 billion HUF. The scheme includes a recapitalisation 
and a guarantee measure. The recapitalisation measure made new capital available to credit 
institutions in exchange for preferential shares with the purpose of enabling them to 
strengthen their capital base against potential losses. The guarantee measure covers new debt 
with a maturity of up to three years for a remuneration aligned on the recommendations of the 
European Central Bank. The scheme is open to all credit institutions of systemic importance 
and it is available only to fundamentally sound financial institutions. Eligibility is determined 
on the basis of an assessment by the Hungarian Central Bank and the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority. The Minister for the National Economy is endowed with the power to 
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grant the aid on the proposal of President of the Hungarian Central Bank and the President of 
the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority.
129
 
The scheme includes several safeguards to avoid abusive uses of the state support. 
These include a special veto share reserved for the state which enables objecting to decisions 
which would lead to a misuse of the funds or which would be detrimental to the stability of 
the financial system. Hungary also introduced a ban on financial institutions advertising their 
participation in the bank support scheme. The state was granted special powers to impose 
limitations on management remuneration while the support measures are in place. Finally, 
Hungary committed to notifying the restructuring or liquidation plans of companies which 
either fail under the guarantee scheme or of banks which can no longer be considered as 
fundamentally sound in the meaning of the bank support scheme. 
Before the publication of the scheme, government officials announced that financial 
institutions receiving support from other states (i.e. foreign-owned banks) will not be eligible 
to receive aid from Hungarian resources. Given that 81 per cent of the registered financial 
institutions belong to foreign stakeholders, the implementation of this declaration could have 
led to open discrimination in the Hungarian financial market.
130
 The final version of scheme 
rendered all banks having their seat in Hungary with a minimum registered capital set out in 
the scheme eligible. 
The guarantee scheme was never used in practice.
131
 Recapitalisation occurred only 
once, in the case of FHB Bank. This will be examined shortly. 
The financial institution liquidity support scheme was put into place in March 2009. 
After its notification to the Commission, it received approval in January 2010.
132
 As the bank 
support scheme, it is also subject to approval every six months.
133
 The measure, financed from 
the rescue package provided jointly by the IMF, the World Bank and the EU, aimed at 
alleviating the severe liquidity shortage in the Hungarian market by providing liquidity to 
financial institutions to support lending to the economy. Support was granted in the form of 
non-subordinated, non-structured loans with a maximum maturity and with an entry window 
open until 30 June 2010. The Commission confirmed that the scheme was in line with its 
Banking Communication
134
 because the level of remuneration met the requirements of the 
external support package provided jointly by the IMF, the EU and the World Bank in 
November 2008. The remuneration covers the cost of funds from the state and the risk 
premium of the participating financial institutions. The level of remuneration of the loans is 
consistent with the pricing of the Hungarian guarantee scheme. 
Three banks benefited from the scheme since its implementation. OTP Bank 
(Országos Takarékpénztár Bank Nyrt), the market leader in Hungarian retail banking, 
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received 1.4 bn EUR (400 billion HUF). In this regard, it announced that at least half of the 
received amount is going to be distributed on the Hungarian financial market, mostly in form 
of credit products for SMEs. In return, it was expected that the state will delegate a member to 
the OTP's Supervisory Board and a member to the Audit Committee of the bank. OTP 
decided to pay back the aid shortly after its initiation. Repayment was supposedly motivated 
by the fact that OTP found that the state aid had a negative influence on its reputation. This 
raises the important question whether the provision of the aid to OTP was altogether 
necessary.
135
 It is also doubtful whether the loan would have achieved its declared aim, 
namely to use the proceeds from the loans to increase lending to the economy. The loan to 
OTP seems to have violated three of the criteria of the Banking Communication of the 
Commission,
136
 appropriateness, necessity and proportionality. 
Another beneficiary of the scheme was FHB Bank (Fejlesztési Hitelbank Nyrt). The 
bank received a loan which was used for increasing consumer credit and introducing several 
credit offers supporting SMEs. After the recapitalisation of FHB Bank in a separate support 
arrangement, the state gained additional shares and its ownership increased to 43.57 per cent 
in the bank. The state received 10.5 per cent dividend from its dividend shares. Under the 
terms of the scheme, the supported credit is to be paid back within five years after its 
initiation.
137
 
MFB Rt/Eximbank was the third beneficiary of the scheme. It has received a 170 
billion HUF (617.7 million EUR) loan with a maturity rate of November 2012. In exchange, 
the bank committed itself to retain and enlarge its retail loan activity on the Hungarian retail 
market. It also undertook the obligation to widen its company loan portfolio with 55 billion 
HUF. 
The legal basis for the liquidity support scheme was provided by a modification of the 
Treasury Act which enabled the government to give loans to commercial banks.
138
 The 
government was convinced that the interest rates applied within the scheme are commensurate 
with market interest rates, and, therefore, there was no need to notify the Commission under 
EU state aid loan. It emphasised that the exceptional status of the affected banks, that they 
have no foreign parent banks, justified the loan agreements, which will place these banks on 
equal footing with their competitors on the market.
139
 The distribution of the loans and the 
government's approach was criticized by the president of the Hungarian Banking Association 
(Bankszövetség) as discriminative and offering excessive advantages to the beneficiaries.140 
He argued for an even, statutory access to the loan scheme instead of the loans being granted 
in individual discretionary agreements. 
In March 2009, the Commission became aware from press reports of the loans in 
question and it sent a letter to the Hungarian authorities requesting information on the 
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measures. In June 2009, the Hungarian authorities pre-notified the measure. Finally, after 
another letter from the Commission in September 2009 reiterating its preliminary assessment, 
the Hungarian authorities formally notified the liquidity scheme on 9 November 2009 under 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. Since the measures had been implemented before the notification, 
the Commission registered the case as ‘non notified aid’. 
The individual assessment by the Commission of the support measures given to FHB 
produced unfavourable results.
141
 FHB received a mid-term loan of approximately 120 billion 
HUF (400 million EUR) under the liquidity scheme which was followed by an injection of 30 
billion HUF (100 million EUR) of capital into the bank on the proposal of the President of the 
Hungarian Central Bank and the President of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority. 
The special dividend-preference shares and the single special voting preference share with 
veto rights issued in this process as required under statute were subscribed by the Hungarian 
state with premium. The bank also issued 46.153.999 pieces special dividend preference 
shares, representing no voting rights, with the face value of 100 HUF. The owners of the 
special dividend preference shares will be entitled for dividend from the profit generated in 
the respective business year, the extent of which is set at 10.5 per cent reflected to the issue 
value. None of the newly issued shares can be transformed into ordinary shares, and they will 
be withdrawn 5 years after they were issued. 
On 19 February 2010, FHB paid back the full amount of the recapitalisation. In 
September 2010, FHB acquired Allianz Commercial Bank Ltd and concluded a long-term 
strategic agreement with Allianz Hungária Insurance Co. Ltd. 
After the start of the initial investigation in April 2009, in 2011 the Commission opened an in-
depth investigation.
142
 It had doubts whether the recapitalisation of FHB was in line with the 
Hungarian recapitalisation scheme and the EU Restructuring Guidelines.
143
 Under the 
Temporary Framework, recapitalisation for financially sound banks should not exceed 2 per 
cent of their assests. In case of FHB, this was not observed as the capital provided was 9 per 
cent of FHB's assets. The Commission also raised the question of whether the recapitalization 
arrangement was used to acquire the shares of Allianz Bank. It was also questioned whether 
FHB, as required by the Hungarian scheme, was financially stable. After the investigation was 
opened, the Commission asked Hungary to provide a restructuring plan to restore the viability 
of FHB, which was duly submitted to the Commission later that year. This first restructuring 
plan was not accepted by the Commission as according to the Restructuring Guidelines the 
plan should secure the restoration of the long-term viability of a company, the company 
involved must contribute adequately to its restructuring, and measures delimiting the restraint 
of competition must be provided. In October 2011, Hungary submitted an updated 
restructuring plan which promised to FHB's involvement in the mortgage bond market and its 
exposure to adverse currency movements. 
Hungary and the Bank claimed that the bank was sound at the time of recapitalisation 
and remuneration was not paid, because interest was not paid to shareholders when the State 
was a shareholder. The Bank has already repaid the capital for the State when the General 
Meeting has decided to pay out interest for the shares.  
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On 21 August 2010 a new law came into effect making it possible retroactively for the State 
to claim interest for the capital provided, even at the time the State was not a shareholder in 
the company anymore.
144
 
According to an agreement between the State and the Bank on 28 October 2010 the Bank paid 
HUF 890 million to the State as a remuneration. This meant on average 3,79 -4,08% interest 
for the capital provided. According to the calculation of the Commission, in case of sound 
banks, the remuneration should be above 10%. As in the Commission’s view FHB Bank was 
unsound at the time of recapitalisation, a higher remuneration should be paid for the capital 
provided. The Bank paid additional remuneration for the capital, totalling HUF 2.6 billion. 
The remuneration paid for the capital provided by the state was also criticised. 
In February 2012, the Commission closed the case with a positive decision. It 
concluded that the measures were in line with its guidance on state support for banks during 
the crisis because the revised restructuring plan would restore FHB's viability while ensuring 
that the distortion of competition created by the aid is kept to the minimum.
145
 The 
Commission took into account the fact that FHB had a limited importance in the retail and 
commercial markets in Hungary and that the bank repaid the capital to the state less than one 
year after its injection. The remuneration paid to the state was in line with the criteria set in 
the Hungarian recapitalisation and guarantee scheme which had been authorized by 
Commission in 2009. 
 
As an interim conclusion we can conclude that aid granted to financial institutions 
during the crisis has been the most problematic field in state aid law recently. Liquidity 
support for OTP Bank, FHB Bank and MFB Bank/Eximbank has not been notified, but has 
been approved later by the Commission under the Temporary Framework. Aid to OTP Bank 
was not in line with the Banking Communication of the Commission as it was not necessary. 
The story of FHB is rather surprising. It is noteworthy that the Commission has not accepted 
the Bank’s restructuring plans and after approval in its final decision ruled that distortion of 
competition was created by the aid, but was kept to the minimum. HUF 2.6 billion was repaid 
to the Budget for approval of the measure. Aid to financial institutions have passed without 
much notice in Hungary. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Hungarian regulation on state aid has evolved over time, but its basic structure has remained 
intact. SAMO has a central role in applying and interpreting very complex rules on state aid.  
Although it is part of the central administration, transparency of its work should be improved. 
The notification obligation to the Minister responsible has produced positive results, because 
the centralised system ensures more compliance on behalf of local administration.  
 
Although the obligation to notify draft aid was breached by the Hungarian State in those cases 
where there was little chance to get authorisation from the EU Commission, Hungary has 
always respected its obligations stemming from Commission decisions and EU Court 
judgements. Altogether SAMO has coped well with the challenges of EU membership over 
the last 10 years. 
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Shortly after accession a repeated problem was how to divide new aid from existing aid. 
Nowadays, after our membership has become more established, no special, country- or 
region-specific legal issues arise anymore. From an economic point of view, as the Hungarian 
economy is very dependent on foreign investments, it is crucial for the State to attract as much 
foreign capital as possible.  
 
 
 
 
